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The purpose of this study was to investigate how underwriters estimate the fair value 
of IPO firms and how they decide on the final offer prices for IPOs. We employ 
comprehensive data on 2609 IPOs from 1975 to1984 extracted from Jay Ritter’s 
database. Data on U.S. IPOs from 2000 to 2013 that include the offer price, first 
closing price from IPO SCOOP, and data from 1651 Japanese IPOs using book 
building from Sep 1997 to Dec 2009, that include the file price ranges, gross 
proceeds and first day returns. Since investors are price makers and they usually lack 
sufficient information, this paper may help increasing the understanding of valuation 
model that underwriters employed and available information that might potentially 
contribute the final offer price. We found that there are significant biases in offer 
prices, which is announced at the time the offer is filed. And our results show that the 
IPO pricing process is a complicated function of many factors. Some of the dynamics 
are explainable under the information asymmetry theory or the partial updating 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
An initial public offering (IPO) is the process by which private companies go public 
and start trading on stock exchanges. After that, investors who purchase the stock in 
the market will become part of the ownership of the company. The intrinsic value of 
the firm is vital in determining the offer price. And the payoffs for the long-term 
investors depend on whether the office price reflects all available and relevant 
material.  
 
Past researches reveal that underwriters generally apply price discount to set the final 
offer price. The reason for assigning an offer price below the fair value (price at a 
discount) may be that this serves as an incentive to encourage investors to participate, 
which result in strong demand which will help boost price, and result in which then 
bring about high initial period. IPO of Facebook is a typical example. Its underwriter, 
Morgan Stanley, faced claims that they had issued too many shares and that the offer 
price was too high. The stock lost over a quarter of its value in less than a month and 





1.2 Need for Study 
Price discovery is one of the biggest problems faced in an Initial Public Offering, this 
consist of two parts, valuation and pricing strategy. Generally, issuers hire an 
investment bank to underwriter the securities issue (Baron, 1982). Since, investment 
banks have plenty of experience and as repeat players, it is believed that underwriters 
could fully incorporate all available information into the final offer price, which 
would satisfy all the participants at IPOs.  
 
The IPO valuation and pricing process starts with the fair value estimate. Generally, 
underwriters use several financial models, like multiples valuation, dividend discount 
models and discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, to determine fair value of the 
securities. Actually, there is not one single valuation technique that stands out in 
being more accurate than the others. Therefore, the underwriters employ more than 
one valuation models to value the IPO firm. Although final offer price might quite 
different from the estimation, valuation is still one of the most important parts at IPO 
process.  
 
Prior empirical evidence shows that the first day returns of IPOs are average 
approximately 15%, indicating that there is a systematic downward bias in the offer 




2012). It is believed that underwriters deliberately set the offer price at a discount of 
the estimated fair value. And, underwriters promote this price discount in order to 
boost investor participation in the auction or book building process. (lowry & 
Schwert, 2012). ‘This results in higher price updates of the preliminary offer price 
that partially recover the discount. However, there is not a full adjustment but only a 
partial recovery of the intentional price discount. Consistent with the partial 
adjustment phenomenon part of the deliberate price discount remains and contributes 
to higher underpricing after controlling for other factors such as investor demand’ 
(lowry & Schwert, 2012) 
 
Although some theories are trying to explain the dynamics of the whole IPO pricing 
process, the facts are far away from clear. There are two popular theories of IPO 
underpricing. The first one is that information asymmetry is a determinant of 
underpricing. Beatty and Ritter (1986), Rock (1986), and Baron (1982) asserted that 
underpricing results from information asymmetry between the various parties 
involved in the IPO. ‘Issues that are characterized by greater uncertainty are more 
underpriced to compensate for the higher costs of learning about these firms’ true 
values’. (lowry & Schwert, 2012).  
 
The other one is that Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggest that ‘underpricing is 




registration period. Underwriters compensate these investors for the information they 
provide by only partially incorporating it into the offer price, thus allowing the 
informed investors to earn especially high returns on the first day the IPO firm 
trades’. (lowry & Schwert, 2012).  
 
1.3 Purpose of Study 
Although final offer prices are extremely important, how firms get prized is 
relatively unknown. This paper investigates how underwriters estimate fair value of 
IPO firms and how they decide final offer prices at IPOs. Since investors are price 
makers and they usually lack sufficient information, this paper may help increasing 
the understanding of valuation model that underwriters employed and available 
information that might potentially contribute the final offer price. 
 
This paper mainly examines the whole IPO valuing and pricing process. Specifically, 
not only we will consider the price updates from price range on the preliminary 
prospectus to final offer price, but also we are going to test how predetermined 
information explain the first-day returns and the relationship between price updates 







Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Purpose and Scope of Literature Review 
Pricing strategy has received much attention in literatures. Though many researchers 
were all trying to explain the predictability in initial returns, but they have different 
aspects. For example, they have diverse markets in various conditions; distinctive 
hypotheses involved and even some investigators worked with similar models but 
come to different conclusions. Conversely, the valuation techniques of IPO were 
relatively lack of concern. Because the ex-ante IPO values and cash flow forecasts of 
U.S. IPO firms are normally unavailable, hence some papers focus on the multiples 
valuation, which only require fundamental information of comparable publicly traded 
companies.  
 
First of all, whether investors can always have a gain in an IPO? Roger G. Ibbotson 
gave the answer in 1994. In his research, he confirmed that the mean initial 
performance of IPOs is positive. However, Ibbotson did not reject the hypothesis that 
an investor in a single random issue has an equal chance for a gain or loss. But, he 
claimed that an investor does have much more chance to have an extremely large 
positive performance than to have a correspondingly large negative performance. In 




whether they are somehow compensated by underwriter who in turn are compensated 
by investors.’  
 
The extremely huge gains are usually due to the great price discount and, David P. 
Baron asserted that underpricing is the result of information asymmetry between 
issuers and bankers in 1982. He tested the impact of nonidentity of two parties 
informed about the capital market on the final offer price. And, by his effort, Baron 
concluded that the offer price would be optimal only if the issuers and the bankers 
were equally informed. Moreover, in the case of that an underwriter is better 
informed than is an issuer; the offer price would below the optimal one. The reason 
behind that is the issuer should compensate the underwriter for using superior 
information.  
 
Furthermore, underpricing would also happen if issuers have strong demands for the 
advising function of underwriters. In that case, the issuers are willing to accept a 
lower price for the issue. However, Tim Loughran and Jay R. Ritter (2001) found 
that although underpricing is an indirect cost to issuers, serious underpricing 
happened only when issuers are getting richer in the form of unanticipated wealth 
increases. In their research, they emphasized the covariance of the price discounts 




why first-day returns are predictable based on lagged market returns is because offer 
prices only adjust partially to new material. Their model is: 
 
 
Where MID is the midpoint of original file price range, r public is industry 
performance beat market performance. 
 
In 1993, Kathleen Weiss Hanley confirmed the positive correlation between the 
underpricing and revisions in the final offer price from the filing of the prospectus to 
the offer date. She concluded that ‘issues that have positive revisions in the offer 
price and good information revealed are significantly more underpriced than other 
IPOs.’ Hanley finally suggested that investment bankers and issuers tend to 
underprice rather than increase allocation. The reason behind that is ‘if the issue is 
rationed, increasing the number of shares issued to meet demand will further dilute 
the original owners’ claim to both the voting rights and cash flows of the firm. ’ 
Therefore, underwriters and issuers prefer lowering the offer price to benefit 
investors in the form of higher initial returns rather than increasing the size of their 




offer prices to the offer range and long-term performance of IPOs. She got the results 
that the long-term performance of IPOs is not relative with offer price. 
 
Moreover, Michelle Lowry and G. William Schwert (2001) found that information 
accepted during the registration period has positive correlation with future IPO 
volume and claimed that ‘more companies file IPOs following periods of high 
underpricing suggests that the initial returns of recent IPOs contain information on 
the market’s valuation of future IPOs.’ And their research results showed that neither 
the number of subsequent filings nor the number of subsequent offerings significant 
explained firm characteristics portion of initial returns. Moreover, the authors 
believed that information received from the secondary market is not related to the 
number of following filings, but associated with the length of registration periods. 
They concluded that ‘Investment bankers’ learning processes throughout this 
registration period cause monthly aggregate initial returns to be auto correlated and 
to be positively related to future levels of IPO activity.’ 
 
Besides that, in order to reveal the other factors involved in the price making process, 
Einar Bakke, Tore E. Leite and Karin S. Thorburn (2011) presented a model that 
using public information to explain the initial returns of IPOs. Interesting, they 
asserted that ‘market-wide information affects the underpricing required for investors 




hiding private information are related with the public outlook of the market. 
Specifically, the authors claimed that when public information is bad, underwriters 
are inclined to set more price discount as compensation to release good news, which 
is called incentive effect. Besides that, writers dug out those public and private 
signals are conditionally correlated and that the probability of underpricing an issue 
is higher in a positive market than if the outlook is poor. That is called demand effect 
in their paper. 
 
2.2 Summary 
Even though the fact that previews researchers could not reach the all agreed 
conclusion, the reasons are different. Based on diverse market conditions and from a 
different perspective, there is no absolute answer. In this paper, we will choose not 
only the data of U.S. IPOs, but also data on Japanese IPOs, which would reflect more 











Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
In order to examine the pricing strategy, we obtain data of U.S. IPOs from 2000 to 
July 2013 that includes the offer price and first closing price from IPO SCOOP and 
data on 1651 Japanese IPOs using book building from Sep 1997 to Dec 2009 that 
includes the file price ranges, gross proceeds and first day returns from Takashi 
Kaneko and Richard Pettway. In addition, we get comprehensive data on 2609 IPOs 
from 1975 to1984 from Jay Ritter’s database. 
 
3.2 Introduction to Research Design 
Firstly, the prices of issuing companies’ stock usually have a big update when the 
IPO occurs, which is known as initial return. Generally, the percent change between 
closing price on the first day of trading and the offer price is huge. The mean 
first-day return is 62.6% in Japan since Sep 1997 to Dec 2009. However, there 
should not have a persuasive explanation about high initial returns if the offer price is 
fully reflect the public information between the file dates and offer dates. Therefore, 
we believe that underwriters just adjust offer price partially to the public information 
deliberately in order to expend less market effort and increase investors demand. 





Initial Returns = α + β1NIPO + β2 BV + β3 SHRS + β4 NYSE + β5 NAS + β7 
AMEX + ε, 
 
In which, NIPO is the number of IPOs happened in particular years, and BV stands 
for the book value of equity. SHRS is the number of shares the company issued and 
NYSE, NAS and AMEX are dummies.  
 
The design of the model is explained by the following contents: firstly, we retain 
some independent variables those are already decided at the time the offer is filed, 
like SHRS. In addition, we want to capture the effects of firm size in the form of add 
tangible book value of equity as an independent variables into the regression. 
Generally, firms with higher book value of equity are likely to have less underpricing 
and hence smaller price updates. Besides that, the mean first-day return presented a 
positive correlation with number of IPOs; thus, we also add that into the model. 
Moreover, empirical evidences show that companies that list on NYSE and NAS 
usually have greater degree of price volatility than firms list on AMEX; therefore, we 
form those three exchange dummies, equal to 1 if the IPO was listed on the 
correspondent market and 0 otherwise. 
 
Secondly, the extremely high first-day return draw us attention. Therefore, we are 
going to examine the relationship between price update from price range to offer 




companies and number of total offering shares: 
 
Initial returns = α + β1 ∆P + β2 AGE + β3 SHRS + ε, 
 
In which, ∆P stands for the price updates and we define the price updates as the 
difference between final offer price and middle point of price range. AGE is the age 
of the IPO firms and SHRS is the number of shares IPO companies issued.  
 
We design the function like above because, the initial returns are performing in the 
form of percentage, thus we set percentage changes on price update to explain the 
initial returns. In addition, we wonder whether offer price itself and gross proceeds 
would affect the initial return. However, gross proceeds are calculated by timing 













Chapter 4: Results and Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
This section of the paper is divided into two parts: (1) Analysis of data. In this part, 
we are going to process and analysis the data. (2) Interpretation of the Results and 
Statistical Tests. 
 
4.2 Analyses of Data 
Table 1: Numbers of Initial Public Offerings, First-Day Return, and Revisions 


















1990 95 9.6 25.3 51.5 23.2 
1991 263 11.0 20.2 55.5 24.3 
1992 362 9.9 37.8 40.6 21.5 
1993 458 11.6 21.4 54.4 24.2 
1994 334 8.6 37.4 49.7 12.9 
1995 387 19.9 19.9 45.0 35.1 




1997 420 13.8 30.0 46.0 24.0 
1998 284 21.4 27.5 50.0 22.5 
1999 465 70.3 14.8 37.4 47.7 
2000 371 57.2 22.1 39.1 38.8 
2001 77 14.3 26.0 57.1 16.9 
2002 67 8.7 32.8 53.7 13.4 
2003 65 12.4 15.4 55.4 29.2 
2004 173 12.3 37.6 41.6 20.8 
2005 161 10.1 34.2 42.9 23.0 
2006 155 11.6 39.4 40.6 20.0 
2007 157 14.3 32.5 41.4 26.1 
2008 21 6.4 47.6 38.1 14.3 
2009 43 10.6 32.6 41.9 25.6 
2010 97 9.3 48.5 39.2 12.4 
2011 81 13.5 37.0 30.9 32.1 
2012 102 21.2 40.2 35.3 24.5 
1990-2012 5236 21.7 27.6 45.7 26.7 
 
The pricing process begins at the time the IPO is filed, however, final offer prices are 
normally not within the price range. From 1990 to 2012, only 45.7 percentages of 
IPOs with offer price in the middle of the price ranges listed in the preliminary 




percentage of IPOs with offer price that below the range. At this part, we mainly 
investigate how price updates from price range to final offer price explain the 
performance of the first-day returns and if those predetermined variables account for 
the high returns. 
 




As Figure 4.1 showed, from 1980 to 2000, the percentage of IPOs below file price 




much higher than the percentage of IPOs above file price range. On average, less 
than 50 percentages of IPOs within file price range and the number seems to keep 
dropping. Moreover, the average first-day returns were 50% above the file price 
range. And it is worth noting that from 1999 to 2000, the average first-day returns 
were 121%. 
 
Figure 4. 2: Summary Table of Book-built IPOs in Japan since September 1997  
 
Source: Kaneko and Pettway’s Japanese IPO Database (KP-JIPO). 
 
From Figure 4.2, we found that the mean first-day return were extremely high in 
Japanese markets. From 1997 to 2009, 1561 companies went public and the mean 




representative three markets in Japan for new listing companies show difference in 
average first-day return. Specifically, the firms listed on TSE Mothers and 





Sections had lowest mean first-day return, 23.2%.   
 
Figure 4. 3: Summary Figure of Total Book-built IPOs in Japan since Sep 1997 
 
 
Source: Kaneko and Pettway’s Japanese IPO Database (KP-JIPO). 
 
As Figure 4.3 illustrated, the number of IPOs and mean first-day return shared 
certain trends. But, in 2000, the number of IPOs was over 200 and the mean first-day 




4.2 Interpretation of the Results and Statistical Tests 
Figure 4. 4: Model 1 Test Results 
 
 
The Stata results table using data on 2609 IPOs from 1975 to1984 from Jay Ritter’s 
database are mostly consistent with the findings of prior literature. Specifically, firms 
with higher tangible book value of equity tend to have lower initial returns 
(t-statistics of -3.00). And, we find that firms listed on Amex are less likely to have 
high fist-day returns. The coefficient of AMEX is -13.7211 with t-statistics of -1.14. 
Although its t-value is not significant, we believe that it is because of lack of data 
and only few companies listed on Amex from 1975 to 1984.  
 
In addition, companies with more offering issues are tend to have higher initial 
returns (t-statistics of 9.25). And a high initial return usually means a deliberate 




price discount to increase investor demand and save their effort. Interesting, the 
result showed that the number of IPOs has negative correlation with initial returns, 
which is quite different from the relationship we found from the Japanese market. 
However, its t-value is significant (t-statistics of -3.78), which means the total 
number of IPOs in one particular year do affect the initial returns of all companies 
offering in that year. One reasonable interpretation is that when investors facing 
hundreds of investment choice, they tend to be discreetly about their investment. 
Thus, the investor demands for each IPO is declined, and then negatively affect the 
initial returns. In addition, which exchange IPO firm list seems to have little effect on 
initial returns in this period. All three exchanges dummies is not significant in the 
regression. 
 






The first thing to note about the second model is that total issues offering shows 
negative correlation with initial return and its t-value is -0.82, which is far away from 
significant. This is opposite to the result we got above using data on U.S. market. 
Moreover, firms with shorter history tend to have higher initial returns (t-statistics of 
-9.44). We believed that underwriters have less confidence in their estimate value of 
young firms. Thus, they prefer to set higher price discount to perform their marketing 
duties.  
 
Moreover, underwriters need to sell the stocks to potential investors; meanwhile, 
they keep receiving new public and private information and seek to obtain more 
accurate estimates about the true value of the company. We find that the percentage 
change on offer price from price range is significant (t-statistics of 6.4) and every 
one percentage of positive price updates leads initial return to increase more than two 
percentages.  
 
The relationship between price updates and initial return is quite complicated. On the 
one side, if we consider the whole price update is a process that issue prices keep 
closing to the market value of the companies, then the correlation between price 
updates from price range to offer price and initial returns should be negative. The 




offer price, the less possibility the IPO has a high initial return. However, on the 
other hand, if we take potential investors’ minds into account, assuming investors 
know that underwriters would not fully incorporate all available materials into offer 
price, and then it is easy to explain that investors take price updates as a positive 










Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This paper investigated the relationship between final offer prices and the file price 
range, the relationship between independent variables those are already decided at 
the time the offer is filed and initial returns and how price updates explained the 
initial returns. While some of our findings provide added support for one or more of 
the existing theories of IPO pricing, others cannot be explained with these theories. 
 
We found that there are significant biases in offer prices, which is announced at the 
time the offer is filed. And, the price updates, defined as the percent difference 
between the midpoint of this file range and the final offer price, is predictably related 
to publicly known firm- and offer- specific characteristics. Apparently, companies 
and investment bankers do not incorporate all available information when setting the 
price range. 
 
Finally, the predictability of initial returns shows that underwriters only partially 
incorporate information that is learned during the filing period into the final offer 
price. This finding is consistent with Benveniste and Spindt’s partial updating theory. 
In summary, our results show that the IPO pricing process is a complicated function 
of many factors. Some of the dynamics are explainable under the information 
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